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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rebecca Allen, a na'ive mother of four, fell victim to an internet check scam and 
was prosecuted in Ada County for felony forgery. On appeal, Ms. Allen argued that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict her for forgery because there was not any 
evidence that Ms. Allen indorsed the fictitious check upon relinquishing possession of it. 
The State responded that "nothing in the statute [J.C. § 18-3601) requires an 
indorsement to pass a check" and even if it did, there was sufficient evidence to prove 
that Ms. Allen intended to commit the forgery and took an act in furtherance of that 
crime under Idaho's attempt statute, I.C. § 18-306. This reply brief is necessary to 
address the State's claims. 
1 
ISSUE 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Ms. Allen of felony forgery where as a matter of 
law, a payee could not pass or attempt to pass a check without a signature? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Ms. Allen Of Felony Forgery Where The 
State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms. Allen Passed Or 
Attempted To Pass A Fraudulent Document 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Allen was convicted of felony forgery after falling victim to a Nigerian check 
scam. On appeal, Ms. Allen asserts that there was insufficient evidence as she never 
passed or attempted to pass the check she received in the mail because she never 
indorsed the back of the check, a requirement under Idaho law to negotiate a financial 
document. 
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Ms. Allen Of Felony Forgery Where 
The State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms. Allen Passed 
Or Attempted To Pass A Fraudulent Document 
1. As A Matter Of Law "The Transfer Of Possession Of An Instrument And 
Its lndorsement By The Holder" Is Required In Order For Party To Pass A 
Check Made Out To An Identifiable Person 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State argues that "nothing in the statute [1.C. § 18-
3601) requires an indorsement to pass a check." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State 
continued: "Furthermore, such a requirement would be contrary the language in 
Booton, 1 supra, that passing a check happens when a check is presented and payment 
is requested. 85 Idaho at 56, 375 P.2d at 538. Allen ignores this authority and reads 
into the statute requirements that do not exist." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State's 
position and argument are not grounded in law. 
1 State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 56, 375 P.2d 536, 538 (1962). 
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In fact, Booton, which was cited in the Appellant's Brief, wholly supports 
Ms. Allen's position that a check must be indorsed before a party "passes, or attempts 
to pass" that document. In Booton, the Supreme Court expressly noted that "Booton 
endorsed and presented the check in question to Fields to be cashed." Id. at 54-55, 
375 P.2d at 337. The Court then held that "[t]he proof is uncontroverted that the check 
itself was forged and that the defendant presented the check to Fields." Id. at 56, 375 
P.2d 538. Thus, unlike the defendant in Booton, where the court concluded the 
evidence was sufficient, Ms. Allen never indorsed the fictitious check before 
relinquishing it. 
Moreover, the State's argument that because "nothing in the statute [J.C. § 18-
3601] requires an indorsement to pass a check," Ms. Allen's claim fails, is without merit. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State is absolutely correct, the felony forgery statute 
does not state than an indorsement is necessary to pass a check. That is because 
another part of the Idaho Code, I.C. § 28-3-101, covers negotiable instruments, which of 
course is what we are dealing with in this case, an alleged forgery of a check, which is a 
negotiable instrument. See J.C. § 28-3-104. As is set out in the Appellant's Brief, 
I.C. § 28-3-201 defines the negotiation and transfer of instruments, in other words, what 
is required to present a check for payment (pass a check). Every word in every statute 
is not individually defined for purpose of that particular statute. Rather, when 
interpreting a statute, "the language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning." State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 569, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). 
Here, because we are dealing with the "passing" of a financial document, the "plain, 
obvious, rational meaning" of pass must be ascertained by those sections of the Idaho 
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Code specifically addressing the negotiation of financial documents, LC. §28-3-101 -
28-3-201. Accordingly, for purposes of felony forgery, in order to pass or attempt to 
pass a document, the State must prove both the "transfer of possession of an 
instrument and its indorsement by the holder." See I.C. §28-3-201 (2). 
2. Idaho Code § 18-306, The Attempt Statute, Does Not Apply In The Instant 
Case 
Alternatively, the State argued that "at a minimum the state presented substantial 
and competent evidence that Allen attempted to pass a check" and that although 
Ms. Allen was not charged under Idaho's attempt statute, this Court should apply 
I.C. § 18-306 because there is "no reasoned basis to interpret the 'attempt' aspect of 
Idaho Code § 18-3601 any differently than the elements of attempt under Idaho 
Code§ 18-306." (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State is incorrect. 
The "attempt to pass" language of I.C. § 18-3601 has not previously been 
interpreted by any Idaho appellate court and is therefore an issue of first impression. 
Construction and application of statutes are purely legal questions, and therefore 
reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v. J.O. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332, 17 
P.2d 272, 276 (2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). "The 
language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." 
Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. "Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging 
in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
5 
a. Given The Context Of The "Attempt To Pass" Language In 
I.C. § 18-3601, It Is Apparent That Language Applies To Those 
Situations Where A Financial Document Is Legally Presented For 
Payment. But Payment Is Declined 
Idaho Code§ 18-3601 in its entirety, provides: 
Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely 
makes, alters, forges or counterfeits, any charter, letters, patent, deed 
lease, indenture, writing obligatory, will, testament, codicil, annuity, bond, 
covenant, bank bill or note, federal reserve note, United States currency or 
United States money, post note, check, draft, bill of exchange, contract, 
promissory note, due bill for the payment of money or property, receipt for 
money or property, passage ticket, power of attorney, or any certificate of 
any share, right, or interest in the stock of any corporation or association, 
or any state controller's warrant for the payment of money at the treasury, 
county order or warrant, or request for the payment of money, or the 
delivery of goods or chattels of any kind, or for the delivery of any 
instrument of writing or acquittance, release, or receipt for money or 
goods, or any acquittance, release, or discharge for any debt, account, 
suit action demand, or other thing, real or personal, or any transfer or 
assurance of money, certificates of shares of stock, goods, chattels, or 
other property whatever, or any letter of attorney, or other power to 
receive money, or to receive or transfer certificates of shares of stock or 
annuities, or to let, lease, dispose of, alien, or convey any goods, chattels, 
lands or tenements, or other estate, real or personal, or any acceptance or 
endorsement of any bill of exchange, promissory note, draft, order, or 
assignment of any bond, writing obligatory, or promissory note for money 
or other property, or counterfeits or forges the seal or handwriting of 
another; or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and 
genuine any of the above named false, altered, forged or 
counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing 
the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to 
prejudice, damage, or defraud any person; or who, with intent to defraud, 
alters, corrupts or falsifies any record of any will, codicil, conveyance, or 
other instrument, the record of which is by law evidence, or any record of 
any judgment of a court, or the return of any officer to any process of any 
court, is guilty of forgery. 
Idaho Code§ 19-3601.2 Without a doubt, this 361 word sentence, which contains 95 
commas and two semicolons, is not exactly a model of clarity. However, given the 
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context and subject matter of the statute, in particular the "pass or attempt to pass" 
language, which deals mostly with financial documents, it is apparent that the attempt 
analysis of I.C. § 18-306 is inapplicable. A party is guilty of forgery if he or she "passes" 
a check with the intent to defraud. Given the nature of the term "passes," to come 
underneath the statute, a party must present a check for payment (indorse and 
relinquish possession) and receive payment in return (i.e. pass the check). Likewise, 
given the context of the "attempt to pass" language, a reasonable interpretation is that a 
party presents a check for payment (indorses and relinquishes possession), but 
payment is declined by the payer (attempt to pass the check). Thus, we interpret 
"attempt to pass" using the common, obvious and rational meaning, a failed transaction, 
where no money exchanges hands. 
Moreover, unlike those statutes where an "attempt" was incorporated within the 
language of the statute, thereby modifying all of the prohibited acts, in this, the "attempt" 
only modifies the term "pass." See generally State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 164 P.3d 
790 (2007); State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006). The legislature could 
have easily written the statute as follows "utters, publishes, passes or attempts to utter, 
publish, or to pass." Under those circumstances, it would be apparent the legislature 
was attempted to incorporate an attempt under I.C. § 18-306, directly into I.C. § 18-
3601. Instead, I.C. § 18-3601 provides "utters, publishes, passes or attempts to pass," 
whereby the "attempt" only modifies the passing of a financial document, which of 
course requires both an indorsement and relinquishment of possession. Thus, it would 
2 The bolded portions of the statue are those under which Ms. Allen was charged in the 
present case. 
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not be logical to apply the "attempt" analysis of I.C. § 18-306, where the legislature did 
not create an attempt offense within I. C. § 18-3601. 
Accordingly, this Court should not apply the "attempt" analysis of I.C. § 18-306, 
but instead employ a rational interpretation of "attempt to pass" as a failed passing of a 
financial document, where payment was not dispensed. 
b. If This Court Finds I.C. § 18-3601 To Be Ambiguous, It Should 
Apply The Rule Of Lenity 
If this Court finds that I.C. §18-3601 is ambiguous with regard to the "attempt to 
pass" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of Ms. Allen. The 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that a criminal statute must 
give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 
U.S. 347, 350-52 (1964). The rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair 
warning requirement under the right to due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 265-66 (1997); see also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788 (2008) 
(citations omitted) ("The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly 
construed in favor of defendants.") and State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 75 P.3d 206 
(Ct. App. 2003) (Recognizing the application of the rule of lenity to an ambiguous 
statute in Idaho). The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for 
interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court 
stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
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interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the 
premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas further spoke to this premise in a 
concurring opinion in United States v. R.I.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). They concluded 
"that it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal 
statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is 
determined that the statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient 
interpretation prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia concurring). The Justices further stated that 
the consideration of legislative history "compromises the purposes of the lenity rule: to 
assure that the criminal statutes provide a fair warning of what conduct is considered 
illegal." Id. 
Moreover, in Idaho, its citizens "are presumptively charged with knowledge of 
the law once the laws are passed." Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 
1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115,130 (1985) (applying 
the presumptive knowledge standard to a due process claim that a defendant was not 
given actual notice of a potential DUI enhancement).) Thus, if the due process notice 
requirement is satisfied merely by the passing of the law, where the law in a particular 
case is ambiguous, this Court cannot find anyway but in favor of Ms. Allen. 
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If this Court were to find that both the interpretation offered by the State and that 
offered by Ms. Allen are plausible, it should apply the rule of lenity and rule in favor of 
Ms. Allen. The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect 
Ms. Allen's due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible 
intent of the legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. 
Accordingly as is articulated herein and in Ms. Allen's Appellant's Brief, the State 
offered insufficient evidence to convict Ms. Allen of felony forgery. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Allen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for felony 
forgery. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009. 
ERIC 'D.FRlt'DERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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